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The Image and Politics of Coca-Cola: From the Early Years to the Present
Introduction
\Coca-Cola" is the most universally recognized word on earth after \OK," and has come to symbolize the
American way of life arguably more than any other product.1 The Coca-Cola Company throughout its
history has invested millions of dollars to perpetuate the drink's image as a symbol of all things good,
decent, and honest about America|a symbol of tradition, freedom, and democracy. 2 Coke is seen as more
than a drink by its loyal fans. It brings on the nostalgia of better times, simpler times, with images of \high
school pep rallies, that rst driver's license, hot rods, swimming pools, and street dances...linking America
to the rest of the world and looming as large as a symbol of the United States as the Statue of Liberty."3
Interestingly enough, the Statue of Liberty was unveiled in New York on the same day that the rst batch
of Coca-Cola syrup was stirred.4 Yet at various times throughout its history Coca-Cola has also symbolized
1Mark Pendergrast, For God, Country & Coca-Cola: The Denitive History of the World's Most Popular Soft Drink 8
(Orion Business Books 2000).
2See, e.g., Flora Steinbach Palazzini, Coca-Cola Superstar 41 (Everbest Printing Co. 1988) (1986).
3Thomas Oliver, The Real Coke, The Real Story 4 (Random House 1986).
4Pat Watters, Coca-Cola: An Illustrated History 9 (Doubleday & Company 1978).
1American imperialism, violence, and death for many around the globe.5 For better or for worse, however,
people identify Coca-Cola as a uniquely American icon. As one commentator put it: \Coke is so strongly
identied with the United States that when countries fall out with us politically, Coke's exile sometimes
closely follows the expulsion of our ambassador."6 Marketing strategies in the more recent past have sought
to establish Coca-Cola as a symbol of international unity and as sensitive to local cultures (for example, the
Company has marketed beverages abroad that do not exist in the United States as a way to cater to local
tastes), yet at the center of this marketing there remains the message that what unites the world, in spite
of dierences, is a distinctly American company and product.7 People may disagree about the reality of
\coca-colonization" (the term given to describe American cultural imperialism) but what seems to be clear is
that Coca-Cola is at the very least seen by many, and has been portrayed by the Company, as an American
representative abroad, a symbol of all that is America.8
Since Coca-Cola, like all soft drinks, is an unnecessary product (it is 99% sugar water and devoid of nutritional
content), to defend its share of the mass- market advertising has been crucial in developing a positive public
image. Thus, Coca-Cola has taken advantage of all opportunities to create a squeaky-clean image from
its early history to the present, and the Company has been blessed with great leadership and political
and business savvy to see it through obstacles both at home and abroad. Yet although the Company has
beneted from politics, has aected politics to a great extent, and has at some times been all about politics,
the Company claims to never enter politics.9 Thus, \it has been perfectly willing to co-exist with Hitler,
bejeweled Maharajas, impoverished migrant workers, malnourished Africans, Guatemalan death squads,
clear-cut Belizean rainforests, or repressive Chinese."10 The Company thus sees itself as having no real
5E.g., J.C. Louis & Harvey Z. Yazijian, The Cola Wars 13 (Everest House 1980).
6Id.
7See, e.g., Ted Friedman, The World of \The World of Coca-Cola" 10 (1992), http://eserver.org/theory.world-of-coca-
cola.html
8Id. at 11
9E.g., Pendergrast, supra note 1, at 451.
10Id. at 452
2morality and no commandment other than increased consumption of its drink. Mark Pendergrast labels this
\the beauty of capitalism," but states that since Coca-Cola will always respond to bad publicity, the public
can monitor its corporate behavior this way.11
Although all companies are prot-driven and create positive images in order to sell their products (not to be
saviors of humanity and get involved in every country's politics), Coca-Cola is unique in that the Company
created its image deliberately to be a symbol of democracy, freedom, and other American values, and has
often armatively acted (as opposed to merely staying out of a situation) in direct opposition to this image
that it has purposely created and perpetuated to the public. The question then becomes whether Coca-Cola,
as a sort of ambassador of the United States, should voluntarily assume a social and ethical responsibility to
its consumers to try to avoid acts that directly contradict its image as a symbol of American values, culture,
and freedom. Since the Company took advantage of political events to create Coke's image in the rst place,
should it not then respect the image that it created by occasionally taking a moral stance? Would this
perhaps result in greater sales over the long run as people gain more respect for a corporation that is true
to its advertising?
The Coca-Cola Company goes to great lengths to conceal what it considers to be damaging or questionable
aspects of its history. For example, The World of Coca-Cola in Atlanta, a museum that opened in August of
1990 that tells a loose chronological history of Coke through advertising memorabilia, video presentations,
live demonstrations, and interactive technology, fails to mention the fact that Coca-Cola once contained
small amounts of cocaine, even though it quite clearly did.12 Similarly, in discussing Coca-Cola in World
War II, no mention is made anywhere of the fact that the Company aggressively sold Coke to the Nazis
in Germany. Rather, the video presentations in the museum focus on how Coca-Cola constructed bottling
11Id.
12Mark Pendergrast, For God, Country and Coca-Cola: The Unauthorized History of the Great American Soft Drink and
the Company That Makes It 10 (Collier Books 1993).
3plants wherever U.S. soldiers were stationed to sustain morale among the troops by providing them with
a piece of home.13 In fact, Company advertising at that time purposefully implied that Coca-Cola was
crucial to the war eort.14 Although The World of Coca-Cola does not mention it, the Company's managers
obviously failed to couple the new patriotic image of Coke with a correspondent curbing of its contradictory
activities in Germany.
It can be argued that companies have no obligation to be moral or ethical in any way, and that they should
do whatever they must to make a prot for their shareholders (breaking the law excepted); yet, if a company
appeals to one's morality or patriotism when it asks consumers to buy its product (implying that to not do
so would be \un-American") it seems reasonable perhaps that the Company should be true to the image
it has presented and also not be \un-American." It is important to note that Coca-Cola is not a big evil
corporation ruining the world|actually, the Company has stimulated local economies, has provided relief
to victims of natural disasters, and supports educational programs in the United States and abroad.15 The
question rather is whether Coke has in the past acted in contradiction to its own image and whether Coke
should in the future try to respect the image that it painstakingly developed{ even when to do so might be
unprotable in the short run, or politically \messy," or contentious.
Coca-Cola throughout its one hundred year history has portrayed Coke in several dierent ways depending
on the cultural and political context of the period in question, yet the common theme running through all
the images has been that Coke is good, moral, and American. This paper examines the history of Coca-Cola
from its early years to the present and discusses how the Company perpetuated the various images it sought
for Coke through brilliant leadership, marketing, and the manipulation of events, and how it was able to
develop and use its political connections to overcome government-created obstacles and cultural resistance
13Friedman, supra note 7, at 10.
14See, e.g., Palazzini, supra note 2, at 44.
15E.g., Pendergrast, supra note 1, at 454.
4to its products both within and without the United States. The paper will discuss the history of Coca-Cola's
international expansion and will examine instances in which the Company's image appeared to be in direct
contradiction with its actions on the international level. Lastly, this paper will describe the Company's
current marketing strategies, and will address the question of corporate social and ethical responsibility and
determine whether or not it is a topic that the Company ought to concern itself with in the future.
Coca-Cola's Early Years: A Brief Background and History
Coca-Cola was originally developed as a patent medicine to cure nervousness and headaches.16 Author
Mark Pendergrast points to the Civil War and the advent of industrialism and the railroad as stressful
events creating a \nation of neurotics," leading in turn to the extraordinary success of patent medicines
to cure imagined ailments.17 Patent medicines provided a safer alternative to doctors (who often killed as
many patients as they cured) and a more convenient alternative for people who lived in rural areas and who
did not have access to doctors.18 Thus, Coca-Cola was in many ways a product of culture and politics, and
was one of thousands of nerve-tonics developed at the time. John Smith Pemberton, a Georgia pharmacist
and Coca-Cola's creator, apparently spent his life \in pursuit of the perfect medicine."19 It was in the late
1870's that he apparently read about coca-leaves|a miracle substance that acted as a stimulant, an aid to
digestion, an aphrodisiac, and a life-extender.20 After experimenting with coca-leaves, Pemberton developed
French Wine Coca, which was an imitation of Vin Mariani, a now-forgotten drink that was a combination
of Bordeaux wine and cocaine. Later Pemberton decided to eliminate the wine from the formula (sensing
the growing disenchantment with alcohol in the South 21) and replace it with an extract from the African
16E.g., Pendergrast, supra note 12, at11.
17Id. at 10; see also Louis & Yazijian, supra note 5, at 16.
18Pendergrast, supra note 12, at 12.
19Id. at 19.
20See id. at 23.
21See Louis & Yazijian, supra note 5, at 15.
5kola nut. In 1886, by combining the oils and avors of the kola and coca extracts, Pemberton created the
original syrup base for Coca-Cola.
Interestingly enough, coca leaves were quite accessible in the United States during the late 1800's. Doctors
and pharmacists were reporting on the use of coca and its principal alkaloid, cocaine, as a possible cure for
opium and morphine addiction.22 Cocaine was used by work gangs throughout the South to double their
workload without fatigue, and kola was used the same way by West African native \kola chewers."23 Yet
Pemberton was apparently the rst person to combine these two powerful stimulants into a single product.24
Furthermore, although soda fountain beverages were already in existence|Hires Root Beer was marketed in
1876|Coca-Cola became the rst widely available product that was at once both a patent medicine and a
popular soda fountain beverage. Frank Robinson, one of Pemberton's partners, suggested the name \Coca-
Cola Syrup and Elixir," describing the drink's two ingredients (the name was later shortened to \Coca-Cola"
in the interest of brevity). Robinson developed the script logo that is now familiar to all around the world,
and put together the slogan \Delicious. Refreshing!" (the \and" was added later) which became equally
familiar around the globe.25 Although Pemberton's new beverage met with some early success, Pemberton
was apparently not a very savvy businessman, and by 1887, with his health failing and with Coca-Cola
still not bringing in the money he needed to pay o debts, he sold his interest in the Company to Asa
Griggs Candler, a prosperous Atlanta druggist, and some others. 26 He was never to see Coca-Cola's future
successes, since he died in August of 1888.
Asa Candler, in contrast to Pemberton, was a shrewd and ambitious businessman and has been described as
22See, e.g., Pendergrast, supra note 12, at 25.
23Louis & Yazijian, supra note 5, at 16.
24Id.
25Watters, supra note 4, at 6.
26E.g., Louis & Yazijian, supra note 5, at 18.
6\the only one to understand the drink and perceive its enormous potential."27 Candler quickly bought out the
others' interests in Coca-Cola, and by 1891 he had acquired full ownership of the properties, titles, patents,
assets, and formula of Coca-Cola for $2,300. In 1892 he founded the Coca-Cola Company. Pemberton's
descendants were to engage in lengthy litigation in future years, claiming that they had been deprived of
true ownership and that Candler had tampered with the original chain of title. Some researchers have
suggested that Candler may have engaged in some forgery (claiming that Candler ordered his nephew to
burn the earliest records of the Coca-Cola Company, leaving only the ocial chain of title intact) to gain
control from certain members of Pemberton's family.28 Yet whatever the real truth is, Candler was good
for Coke|he was energetic and undaunted by early failures, and determined to push Coca-Cola vigorously
throughout the country. He even had aspirations to sell the beverage internationally, and thus planted the
seeds for the product's future globalization. In 1900, Asa Candler apparently wrote to his brother discussing
possibilities for the expansion of Coca-Cola into Europe and Asia.29 Although the amount of Coca-Cola sold
outside the United States (Cuba and Canada excepted) remained negligible during Candler's Presidency
over the Company (he retired in 1916) he certainly was not a bad prophet.
Perhaps the one mistake that Candler made as President was to sell the bottling rights of Coca-Cola for one
dollar to Benjamin Thomas and Joseph Whitehead in 1899. Candler believed the future of Coke was as a
fountain drink, and bottling was an expensive operation that he wanted no part of. Thomas and Whitehead
created a network of independent bottlers numbering about one thousand by 1930.30 Each bottler had an
exclusive right in perpetuity to bottle Coke in his area, and no one else except the soda fountains could sell
Coke in that market. Candler probably thought he had nothing to lose|if they succeeded, he would sell
more syrup and gain exposure for his beverage, and if they failed, at least he had not put up any capital.
27Palazzini, supra note 2, at 12.
28E.g., Pendergrast, supra note 1, at 46.
29Id. at 94.
30Oliver, supra note 3, at 15.
7This setup, which became the heart of the Coca-Cola system, resulted in many problems for the Company
years later. For starters, the agreement did not include a provision for modifying the price of syrup, should
the costs of ingredients increase, resulting in lawsuits brought by the bottlers, and ultimately negotiation to
amend the contract. Furthermore, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) charged the Company a century
later with violating antitrust laws by restricting competition. Lastly, too many of the franchises down the
line were in the hands of third-generation owners who would milk the business by cutting capital spending
(Coke was forced to deal with this problem by buying franchises when they were up for sale in order to
gain more control and put the franchises in more competent hands). In spite of the problems resulting from
Asa Candler's decision, the bottling system led Coke to create locally managed and locally owned franchises
abroad when it began its trend of international expansion. By relying on local investment capital rather than
its own, Coke was able to develop markets at a greater pace than its own resources would allow. Furthermore,
by relying on local expertise of local culture and preferences, the Company was probably ultimately able
to sell more Coke. This ambivalence over the bottling system led author Mark Pendergrast to state that
Candler's contract was \the world's stupidest, smartest contract."31
Coca-Cola's Early Image as a \Temperance Drink"
From the time Coca-Cola rst came into existence, it was associated with goodness and purity. In fact, the
rst advertisement that Pemberton and Robinson placed stated that Coca-Cola was an \Intellectual Bever-
age and Temperance Drink," responding to the temperance movement that was just beginning at the time
and signaling to all that Coca-Cola was a wholesome and refreshing drink that could substitute for alcohol.32
Pemberton and Robinson marketed Coca-Cola as both a patent medicine and a refreshing beverage. The
31Pendergrast, supra note 12, at 72.
32See, e.g., id. at 33.
8National Temperance Movement had been gaining momentum for several years and the Women's Christian
Temperance Union, founded in 1874, promoted the notion that all crimes resulted from alcohol. Coca-Cola,
even then, was appealing to the political, religious, and cultural context of the time and perpetuating a
clean, pure image of itself to appeal to people's morality.
Asa Candler was himself apparently \a devotedly religious man and a complete teetotaler,"33 and when
he took over Coca-Cola he furthered the product's image as \The Great National Temperance Drink" by
regularly placing ads in religious publications.34 Candler spent a fortune on advertising, and the benet
of the religious angle was that it could be used to appeal to all sectors of society, the rich and the poor.
Southerners' anxiety over sin created a religious fervor that Coca-Cola was able to use to its advantage.
Coca-Cola immersed itself in the aairs of the Southern Methodist Church, and nanced more church and
school construction than any other donor in the state. According to one author, \while many political bene-
ts arose from this alliance of church and company, none contributed more to Coca-Cola's explosive growth
in the 1890s than the surge of widespread conversions."35 Coke became the sinless drink for saved sinners
in the South, and drinking Coke became part of salvation. Ironically, Asa Candler's brother Warren (who
was a Methodist minister) had openly shunned commercialism after the Civil War and had warned others
against \Yankee's money-mania."36 Yet when he was sent to start a Methodist mission in Cuba (which the
United States had claimed for its victory in the Spanish-American war), he tried to convert the Cubans not
only to Christ but also to Coke in order to help brother Asa!37 Although neither mission was particularly
successful, it was clear from that early moment in Coca-Cola's life that the Company would be quite willing
to enter politics when doing so would be to its advantage. Additionally, Coke's image was in its early stages
of development: the beverage was already a symbol of all things pure and wholesome, and was on its way
33Louis & Yazijian, supra note 5, at 21.
34Id. at 25.
35Id.
36Id. at 27.
37Id.
9to national prominence.
Cocaine in Coca-Cola and Re-Writing History
With increased success came increased attention and controversy. The drink's cocaine content was becoming
a problem. Newspapers were giving increased attention to the drug and ministers were alleging that Coca-
Cola was two-thirds cocaine (this was obviously a complete exaggeration).38 Cocaine was making national
headlines in part because of a rise in racism and Ku Klux Klan membership both in the South and in the
North. It was rumored that cocaine turned black men into \ends" and that they would attack their white
bosses and rape white women, and the newspapers were lled with sensational headlines warning people
against the drug. 39 It hardly mattered to people that Coca-Cola contained only slight traces of either
drug named in its trademark|or that it would take a hundred glasses of Coca-Cola before a consumer
would be able to feel any eect from the cocaine40{people were still growing frightened. Candler (ironically)
called on the biggest cocaine manufacturer in the United States for help. He wanted to know if it would be
possible to extract all the cocaine from coca-leaves, leaving a residue safe enough to put in Coca-Cola. This
is exactly what was done. Yet the removal of cocaine presented a public relations problem for Asa Candler.
The implication of stating that the Company had decided to remove cocaine from its product would mean
admitting that the beverage did in fact contain cocaine and furthermore that the Company agreed that it
was harmful. As Mark Pendergrast pointed out: \It was unthinkable to admit that Coca-Cola had ever been
anything but pure and wholesome."41 Thus, Candler apparently \orchestrated a might revision of Coca-Cola
history, perhaps convincing himself in the process. In later years, he repeatedly denied, under oath, that the
38E.g., Frederick Allen, Secret Formula 47 (Harper Collins 1994).
39E.g., Pendergrast, supra note 1, at 87.
40See id. at 45.
41Id. at 89
10drink had ever had cocaine in it."42 In 1902, the Georgia legislature made the sale of cocaine illegal, so the
removal of the drug from Coca-Cola was accomplished just in time.
Candler was intent on protecting Coke's image, and if that meant re-writing history a bit, then that was
acceptable. Today the Company denies that there was ever any cocaine in Coca-Cola, even though there
has been no cocaine in the drink since 1903. Anything impure or damaging about Coke's history seems to
be simply omitted or cast in a positive light by Company spokespeople. Another example is the Company's
re-telling of Pemberton's discovery of Coca-Cola. According to tour guides at The World of Coca-Cola in
Atlanta, and according to information provided in Company pamphlets, Pemberton was a poor old Southern
root doctor who simply happened one day to mix the drink up in a humble brass kettle in his backyard.43
Yet several authors have pointed to the fact that Pemberton was actually a well-educated pharmacist whose
discovery was as a result of painstaking research that took place in his laboratory.44 Furthermore, it has
been suggested that Pemberton may have been addicted to morphine at the time he created Coca-Cola
and that he was experimenting with cocaine, and French Wine Coca, principally to cure his own morphine
addiction.45 One nal fact that the Company seems to prefer not to mention is that Asa Candler and his
employees modied the formula that Pemberton had originally developed|to improve taste and extend shelf
life.46 Part of the allure of Coca-Cola for those who drink it is that it symbolizes tradition and stability,47
and so no doubt the Company's managers believe that alluding to any change in the formula would not
be a good idea. Does the Company think that people would care almost one hundred years later (about
the formula, the cocaine, or Pemberton's drug habit)? The Company must believe that it is preferable to
keep certain facts about Coke's history secret, or at least not discoverable without research. This in turn
42Id.
43E.g., Pendergrast, supra note 5, at 9.
44See id. at 10.
45Id. at 27.
46E.g., Watters, supra note 4, at 23.
47See Sergio Zyman, The End of Marketing As We Know It 86 (Harper Collins 1999) (comparing Coke with Pepsi, and
stating that Coke is about continuity and stability, while Pepsi stands for change and choice).
11emphasizes a desire to maintain the image of the drink as something inherently good, without any blemish
to smear its good name. Much of the Company's early battles with the government, in fact, had to do with
proving the drink's \goodness" and combating allegations of \impurity."
Early Government Attacks on Coca-Cola
Dr. Harvey Washington Wiley, the rst head of the Bureau of Chemistry, had fought against food adul-
teration since his arrival in Washington in 1883. Wiley was one of the leaders who fought for passage by
Congress of the Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906, and when the law went into eect in 1907 Wiley became
the top federal ocial in charge of enforcing it. Over the next decade, Wiley fought to put Coca-Cola out
of business.48 Asa Candler, always politically astute, thought that the passage of the Act could actually be
used to the Company's advantage. By supporting it, Coca-Cola would appear virtuous and set itself apart
from all those other bad patent medicines.49 Thus, Asa Candler's brother John traveled to Washington in
1906 to testify in favor of the Pure Food and Drugs Act. When it passed, the Company promptly started
to run ads declaring that its product was pure and wholesome.50
However, Coca-Cola was far from being in the clear. According to author Mark Pendergrast: \Wiley
mounted a moral crusade against fraud and vice...[his] obsession with deceit rather than health issues was
reected in his law," because the Act did not make it illegal for a product to contain poisonous substances,
simply that such substances had to be declared on the label.51 Candler must have felt safe since at the time
caeine (unlike cocaine) was not on the list of poisonous substances that had to be declared, and cocaine
had been removed from the drink. However, Wiley still believed that Coca-Cola contained cocaine and other
48E.g., Pendergrast, supra note 1, at 106; see also Allen, supra note 38, at 48. See generally Clayton A. Coppin & Jack
High, The Politics of Purity (University of Michigan Press 1999)(discussing in detail Wiley's crusade against Coca-Cola).
49E.g., Pendergrast, supra note 1, at 109.
50Id.
51Id. at 111
12harmful ingredients, including alcohol. Responding to such claims, in 1907 the War Department banned the
sale of Coke on U.S. Army bases. Following an appeal by the Company's lawyer (the ban threatened to
tarnish the drink's image as the patriotic National Temperance Drink), the War Department asked Wiley to
conduct tests and resolve the issue. Sure enough, the tests conrmed that Coca-Cola syrup no longer had
any cocaine in it and that the small trace of alcohol present|to help preserve the avoring extracts|was
harmless.52 The Army rescinded the ban later in the year, but although sales in the United States were not
aected, apparently the incident almost destroyed the growing Cuban business.53 The Coca-Cola Company
had opened a bottling plant in Cuba in 1902 to cater to Cubans, tourists, and the U.S. Army. When the
U.S. Army banned Coke from its bases, local competitors began distributing handbills claiming that Coke
was poison. Sales in Cuba plummeted and for rst time (though not the last) the drink became associated
with American imperialism.54
Wiley's next battle was with the drink's caeine content. Although Coca-Cola contained about as much
caeine as a weak cup of tea,55 Wiley's problem was with the fact that while everybody knew that tea
and coee contained caeine, nobody would suspect the caeine content in Coca-Cola since the Company
marketed Coke as a wholesome drink and sold it as such to children. Wiley argued that synthetic caeine
(unlike natural caeine in tea and coee) was injurious to health (of course, to argue that all caeine was
injurious would have risked putting the tea and coee industries out of business), and additionally that if
parents knew that their children were drinking caeine, they would be outraged.56 Under Wiley's direction,
in 1909 the government seized thirty-seven barrels and twenty kegs of Coca-Cola syrup in Chatanooga, with
three more barrels added later, and the case went to trial.
The case was ocially called The United States vs. Forty Barrels and Twenty Kegs of Coca-Cola, and was
52See, e.g., Allen, supra note 38, at 49.
53Pendergrast, supra note 1, at 112.
54See id.
55Id. at 110.
56Id. at 113.
13only the second case to go to trial under the Pure Food and Drugs Act.57 The government contended that
Coca-Cola was adulterated because its caeine content was an added ingredient and injurious to health. The
government further claimed that Coke was misbranded because its name implied that the product contained
coca, yet since Coca-Cola did not contain the whole coca-leaf (because the cocaine had been removed) the
name constituted a false and misleading design.58 Coca-Cola won the case, though not on any scientic
grounds. Rather, Judge Sanford (who was appointed to the United States Supreme Court in 1923) issued
his opinion from the bench, ordering the jury to return a verdict in favor of Coca-Cola. He ruled that since
the product did contain small amounts of coca and kola, it was not misbranded. Furthermore, Sanford held
that caeine was not an \added" ingredient within the meaning of the Pure Food and Drugs Act (that is,
caeine had always been an integral part of the formula since the drink was invented), and without showing
that caeine was \added" the government could not show adulteration. Thus, the issue of the whether or
not caeine was harmful was never reached.59 The ruling seems odd given the fact that regardless of when
in the drink's history the caeine was added, it was still added at some point. Perhaps the Judge simply
wished to avoid the implications for other industries if the jury was allowed to debate the harmfulness of
caeine.
Although this was a victory for Coca-Cola, the Company nonetheless changed its formula to reduce the
amount of caeine (perhaps fearing that since the caeine issue had not been resolved on the merits the
government might later bring suit again). However, Coca-Cola was never again charged with adding a
deleterious substance to its product.60 Authors Coppin and High question Wiley's motives in prosecuting
Coca-Cola in the rst place, pointing to the fact that no serious health issues were raised, and that it was
57Id. at 116.
58See, e.g., Coppin & High, supra note 48, at 143. Interestingly enough, if the drink had contained cocaine, it would
presumably have been illegal in many states!
59E.g., Pendergrast, supra note 1, at 119.
60Coppin & High, supra note 48, at 152.
14a waste of government resources.61 The authors state that Wiley's motives were \suspect" and \Wiley's
purpose may well have been to reward his friends and punish his enemies."62 Coppin and High go on to state
that Wiley may have been angry with Coca-Cola for switching in 1903 from the sugar company of his friend
and supporter John Arbuckle to Henry Havemeyer's American Sugar Rening Company (Arbuckle's bitter
rival.)63 While such pettiness does not seem to justify such an expensive and time-consuming retaliation,
Coppin and High point to other instances in which Wiley may have let his personal feelings inuence his
legal battles.64 Despite these suggestions, Wiley's arguments about caeine with regard to children and
parents' possible lack of knowledge of its existence in the drink seem persuasive|perhaps he was simply
doing his job. Whatever the case may be, Coca-Cola survived these early battles with Wiley (as well as
future attacks and inconveniences from the FDA and the FTC65) relatively unscathed; more importantly,
Coca-Cola's image survived in spite of the accusations of \unwholesomeness" and \deceit." The years to
come brought a new leader who was committed to Coke's image as a symbol of stability and tradition and
who was determined to spread the beverage around the globe.
Robert Woodru: Early International Expansion
In 1919, the Candler family sold the Coca-Cola Company for $25 million to Atlanta banker Ernest Woodru
and an investor group he had organized, The Trust Company of Georgia. Soon the business was reincor-
porated and stock was sold publicly for $40 a share. In 1923, Ernest's son, Robert Woodru, took over as
President of the Company. By the time Woodru took control, Coca-Cola was sold in Puerto Rico, Cuba,
61Id. at 134.
62Id. at 152.
63Id. at 146.
64See id. at 41-2 (describing Wiley's attack on the corn syrup industry as an extension of his paternalism towards the sugar
industry).
65These have included FTC charges of unfair competition, as well as FDA regulation of ingredients that have been controversial
at one time or another, including saccharin and aspartame.
15and Canada, but otherwise was unknown around the world. One of Woodru's greatest achievements was to
open overseas markets, which he did against the express wishes of his board.66 In 1925 Woodru journeyed
to Europe to study market possibilities. He established the Foreign Department (renamed in 1930 to the
Coca-Cola Export Corporation) to deal with overseas issues, and he had his chemists develop a special pow-
dered concentrate to be sent abroad (rather than trying to ship bulky syrup containers). Woodru feared
that the drink might be viewed as an intrusive American product, and using the domestic system as a model
he decided to use local bottlers abroad as well as local trucks, machines, and personnel.67 Woodru needed
the world to view Coca-Cola in a positive light; since nobody anywhere actually needed the drink to survive,
image was just as important abroad as is was at home.
Unfortunately, getting into other countries was not easy, and the Company faced obstacles from both foreign
governments and foreign cultures and languages. For example, in Amsterdam, health ocials forced the
Company to label the drink \limonade gazeuse," despite objections that \lemonade," the European term
for soda pop, implied \a cheap, common drink."68 In Rome, a tax was levied on all advertising signs, and
in Bermuda no large outdoor billboards were allowed at all.69 Problems resulted from language interpreta-
tions as well; for example, apparently the Chinese characters which most closely reproduced the sound of
\Coca-Cola" translated roughly to \bite the wax tadpole," and in Dutch the slogan \Refresh Yourself with
Coca-Cola" meant \Wash Your Hands with Coca-Cola."70 Additionally, some countries already had tradi-
tional beverages that would not be easily replaced|the British, for example, drank tea and their year round
gray climate encouraged hot drinks.71 In spite of these problems, however, Coca-Cola was able to establish
a presence in 45 countries.72 However, it was Coca-Cola's ability to use World War II to its advantage that
66Oliver, supra note 3, at 19.
67Pendergrast, supra note 1, at 168.
68Id.
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71See generally, Hugh S. Zurkuhlen & Mary G. Meeker, The Coca-Cola Company: An International Perspective (Salomon
Brothers 1987)(describing how Coca-Cola has had to contend with many of these cultural dierences throughout its history).
72The Coca-Cola Company, Coca-Cola: The Story of the Real Thing 4 (2000). But see Pendergrast, supra note 1, at 195
16ultimately gave it global dominance. WWII also gave Coca-Cola the opportunity to expand its good image
even further; yet the Company's dealings with Nazi Germany also served as a blatant contradiction to the
image of Coca-Cola as patriotic and democratic|an image that the Company was simultaneously creating
and pitching to the American public.
WWII and Patriotic Coca-Cola: The Unnecessary Becomes the Indispensable
With the advent of WWII, Coca-Cola feared shortages and the subsequent curtailing of business (sugar
rationing, for example, had hampered the Company's sales during World War I). Furthermore, the Company
knew that nonessential products were always the rst to face cutbacks and quotas. It was at this time that
managers of the Company decided to try to persuade the government that Coca-Cola was vital to the war
eort and to the morale of U.S. troops.73 In other words, they were going to turn this non-essential product
that nobody needed into a product that was completely necessary, and not only necessary to drink, but
necessary to ght a war! It was a brilliant strategy, and it worked.
The Coca-Cola Company had been providing Coke to U.S. troops prior to the outbreak of the war, and it had
already become extremely popular on the bases. Shortly after Pearl Harbor, Woodru issued an order: \We
will see that every man in uniform gets a bottle of Coca-Cola for ve cents, wherever he is and whatever it
costs our company."74 This statement probably exemplied a combination of true patriotism and even truer
business savvy. Ben Oehlert, the Company's lobbyist in Washington, immediately got to work, and by 1942
his hard work had paid o: Coca-Cola would be exempted from sugar rationing when sold to the military,
or to retailers serving soldiers. Coca-Cola's competitors were not pleased (especially Pepsi) and contended
(stating that while Coca-Cola had a strong presence in Canada, Cuba, and Germany, \it barely had a toehold elsewhere.")
73E.g., Allen, supra note 38, at 249.
74Pendergrast, supra note 1, at 195.
17that allowing the military to order soft drinks by brand name would give Coca-Cola a monopoly75(and as
predicted, 95% of all soft drinks served on American bases during the war were indeed Coca-Cola products
76). The Army countered that the move was justied in the interest of soldier morale. The War Department
gave Coca-Cola wartime priority status, and informed commanders that they could order entire bottling
plants directly to the front lines right along with food and munitions.77 Thus, bottling machines that
would have remained idle at home due to wartime sugar rationing were purchased from the bottlers by the
Company, dismantled, and own to the front. Apparently General Dwight D. Eisenhower (then supreme
commander of the Allied forces in Europe and a personal friend and golng buddy of Woodru78) was quite
a fan of Coca-Cola and was very happy to be able to supply his troops with the zzy soft drink.79 He
requested the construction of several bottling plants in various countries during the War (which the U.S.
government nanced), careful to note that shipments for such purposes should take place \without displacing
other military cargo."80
While Coca-Cola was not quite as important as \other military cargo," it would not be an exaggeration to say
that it came pretty close. It may seem hard to believe that a soft drink could reach such a privileged status
in the middle of a war, or that anyone was even thinking about soda in such a time of crisis. Yet one must
understand the extent to which Coca-Cola had become embedded in the American way of life by this time.
When the war started, the soldiers craved a piece of home to remind them what they were ghting for.81
According to one author: \No one expected the gush of raw emotion that Coca-Cola aroused in the American
armies. The familiar bottle and trademark and taste turned out to be a poignant reminder of home...for
75Allen, supra note 38, at 255.
76E.g., Louis & Yazijian, supra note 5, at 61.
77See id. at 56.
78Pendergrast, supra note 1, at 199.
79Allen, supra note 38, at 255.
80See Reinhold Wagnleitner, Coca-Colonization and the Cold War 184 (Diane M. Wolf trans., University of North Carolina
Press 1994) (providing the reader with one of Eisenhower's original requests for Coke bottling plants).
81See, e.g., Watters, supra note 4, at 173-4 (describing letters that soldiers wrote home to praise the drink as a source of
comfort); see also Pendergrast, supra note 1, at 206 (citing more soldiers' letters home describing Coca-Cola's signicance to
troop morale).
18millions of young soldiers who found themselves in strange places facing terrible danger...Soldiers wanted
four things from home: mail, cigarettes, chewing gum, and Coke."82 During the war, sixty-four bottling
plants were established on every continent except Antarctica{largely at government expense83|and ve
billion bottles of Coca-Cola were consumed.84 Coca-Cola sent its employees abroad with the soldiers, and
the Army gave these employees the pseudo-military status of \technical observers," a designation invented
during World War I for civilians needed in the war eort. The Coke representatives wore Army uniforms
with \T.O" as a soldier patch, and apparently soldiers nicknamed them \Coca-Cola Colonels."85 Their job
was to make sure that soldiers received their Coca-Cola. Coke was obviously seen as vital to wartime morale
and essential to Americans, indeed a symbol of America itself.
The Coca-Cola Company had spent millions of dollars on advertising to achieve just such a result. In the
years prior to the war, Coca-Cola had been advertised as \the sociable drink" and \the pause that brings
friends together." 86 Even Santa Claus was depicted enjoying Coca-Cola after a night's hard work of toy
delivery.87 During the Depression, Coca-Cola ourished through deliberate, multiple attacks on consumers.
The advertising at the time portrayed people enjoying the beverage while at work and at play, with no hint
of the Depression. Coca-Cola must have realized that people wanted to escape their reality in those hard
times, and the Company provided the escape|showing in its ads \happy-go-lucky tourists at the Kentucky
Derby, Mardis Gras, Carlsbad Caverns, or Old Faithful enjoying themselves with the pause that refreshes."88
On the radio, Woodru vetoed any news coverage that was too sensitive to warrant sponsorship, including
\any remarks about politics, religion, prohibition, and so forth"|anything that might even remotely \arouse
antagonism."89 Yet, although this advertising strategy demonstrated that Coca-Cola would not be associated
82Allen, supra note 38, at 257.
83Pendergrast, supra note 1, at 198.
84Watters, supra note 4, at 164.
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19with anything controversial, it did not mean that Coca-Cola would not get involved in the politics, religion,
and culture of the times when it was benecial for it to do so|for example, its activities in WWII were
clearly political (similarly, Coke's earlier reputation as the Great National Temperance Drink was a marketing
strategy that clearly used religion and politics to its advantage). The Company managers obviously realized
that image was much more important than the product itself; by the time WWII came, the image they had
created did most of the work, probably inspiring a feeling of genuine loyalty in the troops. Other soft drink
companies simply had not become entrenched in the minds of the American public the way that Coke had,
and in this sense Coca-Cola had a head start.
The war provided Coca-Cola with the opportunity to further its already squeaky-clean image. Coca-Cola
was advertised as a symbol of patriotism, democracy, and freedom; the Company sent the message that
Coca-Cola was integral to the war eort. For example, the Company sold thousands of copies of \Know
Your War Planes" booklets, and even sold playing cards, dominoes, dartboards, and other games illustrated
with military themes.90 Additionally, as with Depression-era eorts, the Company's advertisements were
positive and avoided the unpleasant reality of war|\there were no gory scenes, just good-looking soldiers
and whole-bodied veterans."91 Coca-Cola thus created an image of itself as something good even in time of
war, presenting itself as a sign of hope and peace for many Americans|a symbol of good times past and
better times yet to come. It is interesting to note that when the Vietnam War began years later, Coca-
Cola tried the same marketing strategy, except this time it was a failure because the American people were
ambivalent about the justice and morality of the war itself. Thus, Coke seldom conspicuously aligned itself
with the Vietnam conict, although it did send millions of cases of Coke to the U.S. armed forces|just
without the advertised sentimentality and patriotism that had accompanied its sales in WWII.92
90Pendergrast, supra note 1, at 203.
91Id. See also Louis & Yazijian, supra note 5, at 59 (identifying ads that emphasized the soldiers' need to rest and refresh
themselves so they could better deal with the tensions of war).
92See Louis & Yazijian, supra note 5, at 157.
20WWII did more than perpetuate an image, however; it also led to Coca-Cola's dominance abroad, giving
the Company a distinct advantage over its competitors. Following the war the Company reincorporated the
bottling plants that had been set up worldwide, and prepared to sell its beverages to local civilians, many of
whom had already been exposed to Coke through contact with the Coca-Cola Colonels and U.S. troops during
the war. According to one author: \Any other company would have been accused of war proteering, but the
Coca-Cola Company was unique. Because of America's incorrigible faith in the goodness and universality of
Coca-Cola the company was granted a greater latitude in its political and economic dealings than was enjoyed
by nearly any other company."93 Of course, Woodru's friendship with Eisenhower and Oehlert's lobbying
in Washington obviously had a lot to do with the special treatment that Coca-Cola received. Walter Mack,
Pepsi President at the time, complained of the enormous political inuence that Coke enjoyed, and although
Pepsi was able to secure a place in the postwar market domestically (while Coke was tied up abroad) it
was unable to do anything about Coke's monopoly overseas.94 Furthermore, Coca-Cola became even more
popular on the home front after the war because the troops brought their strong preference for the drink
home with them when they returned.95 In fact, surveys suggested that GIs preferred Coke over Pepsi by a
factor of more than eight to one.96 Thus, Coca-Cola's political use of WWII as an opportunity to launch an
advertising campaign that would further perpetuate its good image (resulting in new customers) and set the
stage for international operations that would put it way ahead of its competitors (while the U.S. government
footed the majority of the bill) was a truly insightful (not to mention successful) business strategy.
Coca-Cola and Nazi Germany: A Contradiction
The Coca-Cola Company developed the image of Coke as an American patriotic drink, sending the message
93Id. at 61.
94Pendergrast, supra note 1, at 206.
95Id. at 212.
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21both at the front and at home that drinking Coca-Cola was somehow synonymous with ghting against the
enemies of freedom and democracy. Yet at the same time Coca-Cola was sending this message to its public,
it was also doing business in Nazi Germany, where apparently the \Coca-Cola logo rested comfortably next
to the swastika."97 This leads one to question whether or not the Company should have attempted to curtail
its business in Germany, and whether it was deceptive not to do so. It can be argued that companies are in
the business of making money, not in the business of entering political conicts. This is true, but perhaps if
managers of a company choose to enter politics (and indeed make their product a symbol of politics) then it
seems that they should feel a certain responsibility to be consistent with the side they have chosen to ght
on. That is, not all companies set out, the way Coca-Cola did, to make their product a symbol of patriotism,
democracy, purity, tradition, and America|these are large concepts that are by their very nature political.
Thus, although arguably all companies should have some sense of corporate social responsibility beyond
mere prots, a company which has molded its image purposely to represent the very country from which it
sprung should have an even greater sense of social and ethical responsibility to conduct itself in an honest
way not inconsistent with the image it has created.
Coca-Cola had established a presence in Germany prior to WWII. Ray Powers, an American expatriate, had
started bottling Coca-Cola in Germany in 1929. During the rst four years of the business, Coca-Cola sales
skyrocketed from just under 6,000 cases to over 100,000 in 1933.98 In 1933, the same year that Hitler came
to power, a German named Max Keith (pronounced \Kite") went to work for Coca-Cola GmbH, and soon
Woodru gave Keith full control of bottling operations in Germany. Keith was apparently an ambitious man
with a strong work ethic who was determined to increase Coke sales. There were several obstacles that had to
be overcome; for starters, nonalcoholic beverages were considered \a syrupy concoction for children,"99 and
97Pendergrast, supra note 1, at 213.
98Id. at 214.
99Id. at 215.
22were not popular among German adults, who preferred beer. There was also a great deal of anti-American
sentiment in Germany in the years prior to WWII, and so the situation was not conducive to the high prole
marketing of American brands.100 Yet \[Coca-Cola] learned to combine its interests with those of Germany's
Nazi rulers after 1933 in an overall harmonic symbiosis and thus even managed the seemingly impossible task
of surviving the war intact as an American-owned company."101 Perhaps Coca-Cola's survival throughout
the war is not so surprising, however, in light of how deeply entrenched it was in Germany by the time the
war broke out.
Ironically, it seems that Coca-Cola survived and prospered in Germany by disassociating itself from its
American roots. While at home Coca-Cola was the all-American drink, Keith's strategy in Germany be-
fore and during WWII was to market Coke as a German drink, appealing to industrial workers to \Mach
doch mal Pause" (Come on, take a break).102 One year after 1933, Coke's output had already more than
doubled to 234,000 cases.103 It has been suggested that Coke's success was directly related to the \striking
parallels" between Coca-Cola GmbH and the nation at large.104 Hitler was a proponent of American mass-
consumption and welcomed America's ecient methods of production (although he was anti-American in
all other respects).105 Interestingly enough, Keith's looks and personality have been compared to those of
Hitler, and Keith's enthusiasm for Coke was seen by some of his employees, who were often overworked, as
evidence of his fanatical tendencies.106 It seems that Company and government interests overlapped. The
Nazis regarded mass-production and mass-consumption as crucial building blocks of their new society, and
they must have been impressed by Coca-Cola's modern means of producing a uniform product. Additionally,
Coke's advertising strategies reected values central to the Nationalist-Socialist society.
100E.g.,Eleanor Jones & Florian Ritzmann, The Coca-Cola Company Under the Nazis 2 (1997), at
http://xroads.virginia.edu/CLASS/coke/coke2.html.
101Id.
102Id. at 4
103Id.
104Id.
105See id.
106Pendergrast, supra note 1, at 215.
23Keith supplied Coca-Cola for the athletes and visitors at the 1936 Berlin Olympics, where Hitler was the
proud host to the nations of the world, and where Woodru was a guest. An abundance of Coke's advertising
supported the Third Reich.107 Keith zeroed in on special events (as Woodru had done in America) to further
Coke's image, not as an American drink this time, but as a German drink in Nazi Germany. For example,
Coca-Cola appeared at Hitler youth rallies, as \Coca-Cola trucks accompanied the marchers, hoping to
capture the next generation."108 In 1937, at a \Working People" Exhibit displaying the accomplishments
of the German worker during the rst ve years of Hitler's rule, Coca-Cola set up a miniature bottling
plant \with a miniature train carting Kinder beneath it...at the very center of the fair, adjacent to the
Propaganda Oce."109 In March of 1938, when Hitler's troops went into Austria, Keith convened the annual
concessionaire convention, with 1,500 people in attendance. Keith sat at the main table (a large swastika
draped in front of him), and encouraged his workers to continue their \march to success."110 The ceremony
ended with a \Sieg-Heil" to Hitler.111 In April of 1939, at the tenth anniversary of the German Coca-
Cola business, Keith gloated that the past year had been historic because Hitler had annexed Austria and
Sudentland; yet the spread of Coca-Cola during 1938 was a close second.112 This strategy of direct association
with Nazi leaders and of lending support to events propagandized by Nazi ideology sent a powerful message
to the German consumers and government by signaling that Coca-Cola was on Germany's side.
This show of support for Nazis was perhaps an aggressive advertising technique designed to combat slander
against the company. In 1936, Herr Flasch, who manufactured an imitation drink called Afri-Cola, began
circulating yers depicting Coca-Cola bottle caps from the U.S. with Hebrew inscriptions. Although the
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24inscriptions were nothing but an indication that Coke was kosher, the yers claimed to prove that Coca-Cola
was a Jewish company.113 Sales plummeted, and Nazi party headquarters cancelled their orders. Keith
denounced the accusations in The Stuermer, the ocial Nazi publication renowned for its vicious attacks
against Jews.114 Coke was able to survive the asco, probably through the aggressive marketing techniques
described above. Again, ironically, the Coke bottles in question pronounced that they were kosher to appeal
to the American Jewish population at home; yet here was Keith, denying that Coca-Cola was a Jewish
company, because to be a Jewish company would be a terrible thing.
Coca-Cola faced other problems in Germany, problems that the Company dealt with through behind the
scenes political maneuvering. In 1936, Hermann Goring, Hitler's designated successor, introduced a Four-
Year Plan, which restricted imports to a bare minimum in order to make Germany self-sucient and ready
for war. Although Coca-Cola tried hard to convince Goring that it really was a German business that
deserved government support (it certainly conducted itself as a German business), Goring wouldn't budge.
The supply of U.S. concentrate to Germany seemed doomed, \until Robert Woodru pulled his magic
strings."115 Woodru used his New York banking connections to inuence Goring to permit the importation
of Coca-Cola concentrate. It has been suggested that the Company may have oered a bribe to Goring to
secure the necessary import license.116 In order to reduce the imports to a minimum, Keith began making
his own concentrate so that he needed only Merchandise No. 5 and 7X (comprising the secret formula)
from America. Woodru at the time apparently toyed with the idea of producing even these ingredients
inside Nazi Germany if war broke out, but he nally abandoned the plan as impractical.117 This is the same
man who pushed the image of Coca-Cola as the American patriotic drink, the same man who in a show of
patriotism swore that all U.S. soldiers would have Coca-Cola wherever they went. Woodru had obviously
113See, e.g., Louis & Yazijian, supra note 5 at 58.
114Jones & Ritzmann, supra note 100, at 7.
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25anticipated the war when he considered the possibility of making the ingredients in Germany and clearly had
no qualms about providing Coca-Cola to both Germans and Americans. Yet by perpetuating the image of
Coca-Cola as a symbol of freedom and democracy grounded in America, Woodru should have felt more of
an obligation to be true to the image he had created. If Coca-Cola had not done business in Nazi Germany,
undoubtedly prots would have been lost, but surely a Company that prides itself on its image should not
abandon its image simply to turn a prot.
It is interesting to note that in 1939, when Hitler's troops rolled into Poland, and England and France nally
declared war, Keith (fearing that his supply of concentrate would be cut o by the exigencies of war) invented
Fanta as an alternative drink to see the Company through the war. Fanta is still a brand of the Coca-Cola
Company in wide circulation today around the world; what many may not know is that its origins are in
Nazi Germany.
It is not particularly surprising, then, that Coca-Cola survived the war, since Coca-Cola was part of the
Nazi state. The Company went well beyond mere complicity to outright endorsement of the regime in some
instances, as the examples above demonstrate. Strangely enough, it seems that at the time Americans were
not aware of Coca-Cola's activities in Germany and so did not appreciate the contradictions inherent in
Coca-Cola's advertising during WWII. However, in the years to come people would question the image of
Coke as a symbol of goodness, both in the U.S. and in countries abroad.
\Coca-Colonization" Around the Globe
Building on the goodwill fostered by the American soldier and his soft drink, the Coca-Cola Company
built new bottling plants and held its rst international convention at Atlantic City in 1948, intending to
impress its newfound overseas bottlers.118 By the end of 1950, businesses had started in Egypt, Barbados,
118Pendergrast, supra note 1, at 232.
26Guadeloupe, Cyprus, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, India, Congo, South Africa, and Kenya.119 Additional
plants and aggressive marketing in countries where the industry was already established|primarily Europe
and South America|substantially increased per capita consumption around the world. Upon entering a
country, Coca-Cola would locate a wealthy, socially prominent, politically inuential bottler. Key employees
were then brought to the U.S. for extensive training before returning to their respective countries to run the
bottling plants as new \Coca-Cola Men."120 Thus the overseas bottlers were generally local, knowing the
language and culture of their populace (and presumably the most eective marketing strategies to capture
their consumers' attention). Coca-Cola attempted to entrench itself in local culture. Additionally, Coca-
Cola often brought much-needed technology for cleaning water, paid decent wages in comparison to local
standards, and stimulated local economies.
In spite of this \local" approach that the Company has always prided itself on, not everybody was happy
to see Coca-Cola following WWII. Under the Marshall Plan, Europe was rebuilt with massive infusions
of American capital. The aid obviously gave American multinational corporations such as Coca-Cola a
boost, and this in turn brought resentment from other nations. The Communists viewed Coca-Cola as the
tting symbol of degenerate capitalism, and in countries around the world they defamed the American soft
drink in the press, lobbied against it in legislatures, and \whispered of its vile eects in back alleys."121
Additionally, competing local industries in many countries|such as the beer, wine, mineral water, or local
soft drink industry|resented the aggressive American company. Some people also viewed Coca-Cola as a
symbol of American cultural imperialism, hence the term \coca-colonization." Thus, although Coca-Cola
was very much identied with America, it was for many around the globe not seen as symbolic of good values,
honesty, or goodness the way it was seen at home. Rather, it was seen as a symbol of economic and cultural
imperialism, no doubt much to the chagrin of the Coca-Cola Company, which as has been demonstrated
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27took pains to display Coke only in the best possible light.
Coca-Cola faced threats and rumors around the world. In Italy, the Communists asserted that Coca-Cola
turned hair white, and in Switzerland Company managers waged a bitter battle against health legislation
that would have prohibited the drink because of its phosphoric acid.122 Belgian brewers bought several
franchises and then refused to bottle the drink when their health ministry declared the drink a harmful
laxative. In Japan, the drink reputedly sterilized women, and in Brazil Coca-Cola supposedly caused cancer
and rendered Latin men impotent.123 In 1954 in Egypt, Coke sales plummeted when a Muslim demagogue
asserted that the drink was made with pig's blood|forbidden because of the religion's prohibition against
pork. As one author put it: \Coke would have been better o laced with strychnine."124 In 1950 in Vienna,
the Viennese Communist newspaper Der Abund published an article in which the soft drink was compared
to stinking, melted shoe-cream, which the author was barely able to consume.125
The French Fiasco
It has been suggested that many Europeans resented the inux of American companies because they brought
with them a culture of mass consumption and instant gratication that would undercut traditional culture,
family values, and parental guidance: \Coca-Cola was the item that the French chose to symbolize this per-
nicious pleasure principle in the global transmission of American mass culture. The soft drink, in this French
campaign, was turned into an icon of an alleged American strategy of cultural imperialism. It also gave the
strategy a name: Coca-Colonization."126 Forced out of the governing coalition in 1947, the Communists
still remained the largest in the French National Assembly, where they warned against \American imperial-
ism" and the Marshall Plan. In many ways Coca-Cola chose to enter Cold War politics, and thus it is not
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28surprising that it became the symbol of what Communism would ght against. James Farley, the chairman
of the board of the Coca-Cola Export Corporation, was a former aide to President Roosevelt and a major
gure in American politics; Farley was a militant anti-communist and in 1950 he warned that Americans
and Coke would have to ght the \treasonable practices of totalitarian communism."127 Ironically, in 1941
one of Farley's friends claimed that Farley was \divorced from politics" in his new job at Coca-Cola128; quite
to the contrary, Farley contributed to making Coca-Cola all about politics, particularly to the Communists.
Coca-Cola became a convenient symbol of everything wrong with America. The French Communists insisted
that the Coca-Cola distribution organization doubled as a spy network, and the rumor spread that Coca-Cola
intended to advertise on the facade of the Notre Dame.129 When the Company applied to the authorities
for permission to bottle in France, the Communists attempted (and failed) to have the drink banned as a
poison.130 Besides the Communists, the government also encountered heavy lobbying from winegrowers, and
there were fears that the beverage might be addictive and harmful because if its caeine or \some other
secret ingredient."131
The French government tried to maneuver between the domestic opposition to Coke and the need to avoid
confrontation with the United States. Trying to discourage the American Company, the government imposed
a de facto embargo that prevented Coca-Cola from importing the concentrate into France.132 The Company
retaliated, hiring a team of lawyers and using its contacts within the French administration to make its case
that Coca-Cola was in no way harmful, that it was being sold in 76 countries, and that its advertising was
not excessive or destructive.133 Ultimately the Company sought the intervention of Washington; not wanting
to link Coca-Cola too closely to the Marshall Plan, the State Department remained aloof at rst but nally
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29acted.134 The American ambassador in Paris told the French government that the United States would
resist arbitrary discrimination against an American product, and warned against possible repercussions if
the harassment of Coca-Cola were to continue. Additionally, Farley (the man described as \divorced from
politics") stirred up the American public by claiming that France was showing very little gratitude after
America had liberated her from the Nazis, and that perhaps the American Congress should cut o economic
aid.135 In April of 1950, the French government quietly lifted the embargo but asked Coca-Cola Export to
exercise discretion and limit such exports to reasonable needs.
The aair sparked bitter reactions from several French journalists, who accused the Marshall Plan bureau-
crats of \monitor[ing]...and correct[ing]...all aspects of our economy and even our policies."136 Others
complained that America was trying to \assimilate" France by changing its national beverage, stating that
\wine is the most ancient feature of France. It precedes religion and language; it has survived all kinds
of regimes. It has unied the nation."137 Despite such opinions, however, France had accepted so much
economic aid from the U.S. that banning Coca-Cola obviously made the French government look disagree-
able and discriminatory. Furthermore, despite all the fear of coca-colonization, it seems that Coca-Cola
and other multinationals did very little to change the structure of local cultures in the way that had been
anticipated. The French still had their wine, and the British their tea. As one author commented: \Euro-
pean life by the 1990s seemed not to have been so fundamentally transformed by the presence of American
television series, movies, and merchandise...the European city...could never be mistaken for Atlanta or Los
Angeles, nor did the European styles of living mirror American habits and customs."138 Another author
pointed out that although Coca-Cola still attracted its share of scorn throughout Europe, its selection as a
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30target for generalized abuse of American cultural and commercial intrusiveness had greatly diminished by
the 1960s.139 By 1960 in Austria, instead of being compared to \stinking melted shoe-cream," Coca-Cola
had become associated with good manners and wholesomeness (just what the Company had hoped for) as
one Austrian author stated: \It seemed particularly positive that almost two hundred visitors at one dance
club consumed only two liters of wine, half a bottle of brandy, and twenty-ve bottles of beer. In contrast to
the limited quantity of alcohol, approximately two hundred bottles of Coca-Cola were consumed."140 Thus,
by remaining patient and continuing to push its product abroad, Coca-Cola ultimately prevailed over initial
resistance. In many ways the resistance may have helped Coke: Coca-Cola was \the forbidden drink," an
exotic temptation that people wanted to try.141 However, although Coca-Cola did expand in France after
the aair, apparently it was never accepted as readily as elsewhere in Western Europe.142
What is clear from the above discussion is that wherever it went, Coca-Cola pulled strings to continue selling
its soft drink, and this is exactly what any company should do to push its product and raise sales. Yet the
French asco demonstrates again that Coca-Cola did enter politics when necessary. Coca-Cola managers
put Coke in the middle of the Cold War, and then used their political clout to get the embargo lifted and
continue operations in France. The Company, as mentioned, claims that it has remained neutral on all issues
and has been non-political throughout its history.143 Yet this is disingenuous to say the least, and arguably
an excuse that the Company uses to justify its philosophy of doing business in all countries regardless of
political or social climate. \We've never lost an election, because we never run," is what one Coke manager
apparently told author Mark Pendergrast.144 Yet Coke's role in WWII and postwar France are examples
of how Coca-Cola has not only engaged in politics but has also aected politics. This in turn invites the
139Transactions, Transgressions, Transformations: American Culture in Western Europe and Japan 39 (Heide Fehrenbach &
Uta G. Poiger eds., 2000).
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142Kuisel, supra note 127, at 68.
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31question whether or not Coca-Cola should have used this power, and should perhaps use it today, not only to
make a prot but also occasionally to accomplish a greater social good. The Company has no legal obligation
to do anything beyond that required by law (although in some cases Coca-Cola has even failed to do this
much) but perhaps it should do so anyway, out of a sense of corporate ethical or social responsibility|and
perhaps because of the fact that it has perpetuated an image of itself as the model citizen and an image of its
product as symbolic of all things decent and good, grounded in the American way. If Coke is indeed \Amer-
ica's cultural emissary,"145 as it has so often been described (and as it has been purposely advertised), then
perhaps it should conduct itself in a legal, responsible, and ethical manner worthy of its title. There have
been several occasions (discussed below) in which Coca-Cola's actions have been questionable|occasions in
which Coca-Cola has failed to live up to the image it has created for itself. Some of these actions border on
illegality, while others are simply unethical or immoral.
The Guatemala Crisis
Coca-Cola has often hidden behind its franchise system, claiming that the parent Company cannot monitor
what its franchisees do on a daily basis around the globe. Yet as one author pointed out: \Their detachment
from a bottler's activities, even if laws or human rights have been violated, is conspicuously inconsistent with
the company's obsession with overseeing local production and promotion."146 In other words, Coca-Cola
picks and chooses when to get involved and when not to get involved. The crisis in Guatemala that began in
1975 serves as an example of Coca-Cola's unwillingness to intervene to curb illegal and unethical franchise
activity.
In 1986, Guatemala returned to a civilian-led government after more than thirty years of virtual military
rule, resulting in a \grudging new respect for certain human rights."147 Coca-Cola had been bottled in
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32Guatemala since 1939, and the Coca-Cola workers began the rst successful attempt to organize a union in
1975. They wanted better working conditions, an end to twelve-hour shifts, and an increase of the $2.08
to $2.50 base pay per day. Although they observed all the legalities, they were immediately thwarted by
John Trotter, an attorney from Houston and the Coca-Cola franchise's right-wing, anti-communist president,
who used his connections with the Guatemalan military to intimidate members of the union's leadership.148
Trotter's association with Coca-Cola had begun in 1957, when he assumed control of the Guatemala City
franchise. Three years earlier, a military coup had resulted in the replacement of President Jacobo Arbenz
Guzman with the rst of a series of military-oriented, ultraconservative regimes. The ensuing leaderships
sought to repress unionism or any organizing of workers, and the confrontations rendered Coca-Cola the
national symbol of the country's labor movement and the symbol of death for many associated with the
cause.149
The brutalities committed against the union, Trotter's connection to these acts, and the Coca-Cola parent
Company's awareness of Trotter's connections, lead one to question why the Coca-Cola parent Company
did not intervene earlier than it did. First it is important to note and understand the facts. Trotter had
never signed a union contract in his life, and was not about to start|in fact, he believed that unions were
a symptom of Communism that should be crushed at all costs.150 Thus, instead of succumbing to the
union's demands, Trotter hired new workers at $3.00 per day if they agreed not to join the union. He
then sliced the company into thirteen legally separate paper corporations to neutralize collective bargaining.
The company then petitioned the court to rescind the union request because it claimed to have reached an
agreement with the workers; to verify this claim, the company provided the court with a document signed
by all the workers who had recently been hired at $3.00 per day. The court accepted the evidence and
aborted the union, despite the obvious fraud inherent in the charade. Trotter apparently had close political
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33connections that could inuence court decisions such as this one.151 The workers, in protest, staged a sit-in
protest on the Coca-Cola plant's property, but Trotter called in the anti-riot military police, which beat the
workers, rendering several unconscious.152 The following day, Trotter red 150 of the workers, but had to
reinstate them because ring them constituted a violation of even Guatemala's minimal labor laws. The
local media covered the struggle. At this point, Coca-Cola was well on its way to becoming a symbol of
political oppression and violence.
Events at the Coca-Cola plant in Guatemala had for some time been under scrutiny by a group of Coke
shareholders in the U.S. There were several churches and religious orders that happened to own shares in the
Company and belonged to an organization called the Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility (ICCR).
ICCR believes in using shareholders' rights to put pressure on large corporations by raising issues in public
and submitting resolutions to corporate annual meetings.153 The ICCR approached the headquarters of
Coca-Cola in Atlanta towards the end of 1976, and led a stockholders' resolution calling for the Company
to investigate its Guatemala franchise. The Company agreed to investigate if the group agreed to withdraw
its resolution. The investigation was a whitewash, and the shareholders were not convinced. The seven-
page report accepted at face value Trotter's denials that he underpaid, intimidated, and abused his workers,
concluding that the situation did not justify the termination of the bottler's agreement.154 In 1977 the
ICCR led another resolution calling for Coca-Cola to establish minimum labor standards for its bottlers
worldwide. This time, Coca-Cola managers in the U.S. arranged a meeting between Trotter and the ICCR
in Guatemala, at which point a pact was nally signed in the presence of ICCR representatives between
Trotter and his workers, 94% of whom were union members.155 This rst settlement obviously demonstrates
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34that Coca-Cola did have the power to intervene, yet it took an attack on its image through pressure from
the church to spur the Company into action.
The brutalities did not cease, however. In 1978, Israel Marquez, the secretary of STEGAC (as the trade
union at the Coca-Cola plant was called) was attacked by machine guns as he drove home.156 Later that
month, Trotter apparently met with the Guatemalan national police chief and was assured that the union
would be destroyed within six months.157 According to Marquez, Trotter threatened to kill Pedro Quevedo,
another union ocial, and his name was placed on a hit list of the Secret Anti-Communist Army, \one of the
most feared right-wing death squads."158 Eight days after the threat, Quevedo was murdered while making
deliveries in his Coca-Cola truck. That day, just before the shooting, Trotter ordered his security force to
the plant, further indicating to the workers that Trotter had foreknowledge of the assassination.159
A third stockholders' resolution was led in 1979 and survived until the company's annual meeting in May
1979. Usually a tranquil aair to assess the year's success, the dramatic point of this meeting was an address
given by Israel Marquez recounting the beatings, bribes, threats, murders, and shady police and military
ocials in and about Trotter's franchise. Marquez concluded by stating that in Guatemala, Coca-Cola had
become a name for murder, and he urged passage of the resolution, which again called for minimum labor
standards.160 Company management urged defeat of the resolution, arguing that it had no right to interfere
in labor disputes between independent parties and asserting that such an intrusion would be improper.161
Coca-Cola managers stated they could do nothing unless there were given \concrete proof" of Trotter's
wrongdoing.162 Company managers did not discuss the fact that sales had plummeted in Guatemala, giving
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35Pepsi a sizeable lead, or that Coca-Cola's image had been badly maligned.
The Coca-Cola Company stated that it could not legally break its contract with Trotter, yet this probably
merely served as an excuse; Trotter's contract, far from being open-ended as the Company had led the
ICCR to believe, was up in 1981.163 Furthermore, in light of the bloodshed in Guatemala, it would have
been perfectly appropriate for the parent Company to intervene and break Trotter's contract earlier. The
Company already dictated bottlers' production, selling, distribution, and promotional procedures down to
the last detail; intervening in light of allegations of intimidation and murder by one of its bottlers would
seem to be even more important. Furthermore, several of Coke's franchises had contracts that permitted the
parent Company to withdraw a license if there was \a violation of ethical and business norms."164 Yet the
Company's investigations in Guatemala were undertaken more to appease its religious shareholders than to
uncover any wrongdoing by Trotter, as is evidenced by the fact that those who could testify to Trotter's role
in the bloodshed were not interviewed by Coke's investigators.165 It seems as though Coca-Cola managers
wished to have their cake and eat it too: be able to control all marketing and production activities of the
overseas bottlers, and at the same time not be held responsible when bottlers independently used tactics
that degraded human rights and basic minimum labor standards. Considering the Company's focus on its
clean and wholesome image, it is surprising that the Company did not get rid of Trotter sooner, if not in the
name of human dignity then at least in the name of its image and decreased prots. It has been suggested
that the Company believed that acting hastily would \open a Pandora's box,"166 and establish a precedent
that would require the Company to intervene anywhere in the world \whenever employees had a grievance
with their local bottler."167 This seems like a logical explanation, but it is strange that the Company chose
to ignore that murder, bribes, and torture did not constitute one's average \grievances." There should
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36be some corporate responsibility to intervene when people are dying; hiding behind the franchise system
surely cannot be the right solution. One author suggests that mismanagement characteristic of any Western
bureaucracy, a misunderstanding of trade unions, and the lack of an accountability system on human rights
no doubt contributed to Coca-Cola's bad choices.168
Although the managers of Coca-Cola did not break Trotter's contract, they did decide not to renew it
in 1981. Coca-Cola was ultimately forced to do at least this much, since they were facing international
pressure from the International Union of Food and Allied Workers (IUF), Amnesty International, and even
the U.S. State Department,169 not to mention consumer boycotts around the world. Coca-Cola found a new
owner, and following repair work and construction on the plant, work resumed at the Guatemala bottling
plant on March 1, 1985. Although the crimes perpetrated in Guatemala were not directly attributable to
Trotter or Coca-Cola (after all, the Guatemalan military government was intent on destroying unions and
suspected communists as part of their own agenda) there is no question that Trotter used the political
regime to his advantage. Coca-Cola, as the parent Company, should not have tolerated Trotter's behavior,
and should have pulled out of Guatemala to avoid association with such tactics even if doing so would
have hampered future production in Guatemala. The issue of corporate social and ethical responsibility
was addressed at the Company's annual meeting in 1985. Church shareholders and IUF representatives put
forth a measure that would require all subsidiaries and future franchises of Coca-Cola to observe the basic
human rights of their employees. Coca-Cola's managers, however, called the proposal \unworkable," stating
that it would encourage parties to look to the parent Company instead of solving problems at the local
level.170 Nonetheless, shareholders cast 6,385,818 votes (6.4 percent) in favor of the proposal, double the
usual percentage received for social responsibility initiatives.171 The Guatemala crisis had obviously brought
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37such issues to the forefront of people's minds, even if the proposal did not ultimately receive enough votes.
The Arab Boycott
Although not as ethically questionable as Coke's role in the Guatemala crisis described above, the Arab
boycott of Israel provides another example of Coca-Cola trying to reconcile its image as an American, moral,
good product with its international activities. After WWII, Coke moved into the Middle East, the perfect
market with its hot sandy climate and religious taboos against alcohol. By 1966 Coke had eighteen bottling
plants in most of the Middle Eastern countries. However, Coca-Cola was not bottled in Israel at the time,
no doubt because of the policies of the Arab League. The Arab League, founded in 1945 to promote Arab
interests, was waging an economic war against Israel by refusing to do business with the new state (primary
boycotts) and by refusing to have economic relations with companies that did business with it (secondary
boycotts).172 In 1966, Paul Austin, the tenth President of the Coca-Cola Company, refused to grant a fran-
chise to an Israeli bottler. The topic made headlines, and within a week the American Jewish community
was calling for a boycott of its own against Coke.173 Manhattan's Mount Sinai Hospital stopped serving
Coke, and Nathan's Famous Hot Dog emporium on Coney Island threatened to do the same. Oended Jews
in Chicago and Los Angeles apparently threw Coke coolers out of second-story windows.174 The Company
responded that the market in Israel was not conducive to protable sales, and that the Company would of
course never respect the Arab boycott of Israel.175
Nobody bought the Company's explanation, and the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith investigated,
concluding that Israel's consumption mirrored Ireland's, which had three Coke bottling plants.176 Addition-
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38ally, Coke's refusal to grant the franchise was clearly inconsistent with its expansionist goals. Realizing that
it could not aord to lose its Jewish American consumers, Coca-Cola reconsidered its position. Eight days
after the scandal began Coke announced that it had granted Israel's rst franchise in Tel Aviv. Six months
later, the Arab League voted to ban Coca-Cola products, and the Company was added to the blacklist, in
spite of Coke's eorts to convince the league that the Company was not investing one cent inside Israel|the
business there was merely a franchise, not a subsidiary.177 Coke had to watch as the Middle Eastern business
collapsed after twenty years of hard work. Yet although the Middle Eastern market was much more protable
than the Israeli market, the Company obviously thought that it would lose money if it alienated the Jewish
American population at home. The Company crunched the numbers and came up with a decision in favor of
granting the franchise in Israel. As one author put it: \In what must have been a painful decision, it [Coke]
was forced to choose between its image at home and a fruitful market abroad."178
Ultimately it seems that Coke fell victim to its own symbolism as the typical American product. On the
one hand, the American public expected Coke to make the right, moral decision because the Company had
always presented itself and its product as inherently good, honest, and pro-American. Yet on the other hand,
the Arabs viewed Coke's decision as an indication that the American Company was a Jewish sympathizer,
as (no doubt) most Americans were in their minds. The Anti-Defamation League congratulated Coke on its
\morality" in protesting the boycott and contributing to the economic welfare of Israel. In 1977 Austin was
awarded a medal for \distinguished service to democracy and freedom."179 The irony is that Coke's decision
was not a moral one at all (if Coke had felt some ethical duty to grant the franchise in Israel it would have
done so at the beginning, on its own, without pressure from the public). Additionally, Coke was constantly
on the lookout for ways to break the ban and get back into the Middle East market. Coke was successful
in re-entering Egypt in 1976, a country economically crippled and still recovering from the 1973 war, and
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39in need of Western aid.180 As the Arab boycott steadily eroded (it ocially ended in 1991) other countries
began lifting the ban on Coke, including Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
The Iron Curtain
In 1965, Paul Austin convinced Woodru that Coke would do just as well behind the Iron Curtain as it did
in America. The Bulgarian government signed on as a Coca-Cola bottler, and Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and
Yugoslavia soon did the same. Austin initiated contacts with the Soviet government, and asked the State
Department if it would object to the sale of Coca-Cola in Russia. After receiving a favorable consensus from
the government and from other advisors|including Farley who had raged against Communism following
WWII181{Austin sent representatives to the Kremlin to work out the details. When the plan leaked out to
the U.S. media, however, the company received negative press. Newspapers complained that the prots from
Russian Coke would be used to help the Communists in Vietnam, whose troops were killing U.S. soldiers.182
Austin ultimately concluded that Americans were not ready for a relationship with the Communists and
backed out of the deal.
There was a certain irony, again, in Coca-Cola trying to play on both sides of the same war|of oering
full support to Lyndon Johnson and the anti-Communist cause in Vietnam (although not advertising such
support as it had done in WWII since this time many Americans were ambivalent about the war) and at
the same time trying to inltrate the market in Russia. Of course, Coca-Cola has always viewed itself as
serving humanity, regardless of politics and world conict. Yet the fact is that Coca-Cola has beneted
from politics|from its cozy relationships with U.S. presidents183 to its marketing strategies that have taken
180Id.
181Pendergrast, supra note 1, at 284.
182Id. at 285.
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40advantage of politics and religion to create an image of itself as symbolic of all that is good and American.
Thus, surely it is disingenuous and hypocritical to then turn around and claim neutral status in the name
of prots abroad. Perhaps this would not be the case if Coca-Cola had never held itself up as a bastion of
American democracy, patriotism, and goodness; that is, if the Company had not used politics to create this
image, there would be no hypocrisy. Perhaps this is the reason that when Pepsi (who had not advertised
itself as America's ambassador abroad) began business in Russia around the same time, the papers did not
even mention it.184
With the fall of the Berlin Wall Coke had a new market of ex-Communists to pitch their drink to, and in
1991 the Company poured $450 million into East Germany alone to upgrade outmoded government plants
and train new Coca-Cola workers. While Coke's surge in East Germany was quick, Eastern Europe and
Russia were harder to inltrate since Pepsi dominated in those regions. Yet Coca-Cola was determined,
forming a Ukrainian joint venture, as well as a partnership in Moscow to fund a syrup plant and 2,000
kiosks throughout the city.185 In addition, despite the 1989 massacre in Tiananmen Square, Coke continued
to expand, forming joint ventures with the Chinese government. Apparently the Chinese government saw
Coca-Cola as a symbol of its socialist market economy, according to one Coke executive.186 By 1993 the
annual per capita consumption in China had increased by 38% to two drinks a year.
South Africa
Coca-Cola's activities in South Africa have been questionable at times. Coca-Cola arrived in South Africa in
1938. American capital was very important to the South African economy, as was evident by the Sharpeville
massacre in March 1960, when South African police red on unarmed African protestors of apartheid,
provided by the state in favor of free travel aboard Coca-Cola's aircraft to and from Washington, and how during his travels to
Europe and Japan he was greeted at each stop by Coca-Cola executives).
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41killing sixty-nine and wounding over two hundred.187 The massacre provoked an international public outcry
and massive capital ight, but many American corporations helped the situation with substantial new
investments, including Coca-Cola; the South African government survived the crisis and by the end of the
1960s, American direct investment had topped $1 billion.188 According to one author: \The ironies in all this
are palpable. At the very moment that the United States began tentatively to confront the problem of racial
inequality, it was deeply implicated in the elaboration of apartheid in South Africa."189 It was reported in
1973 that Coca-Cola paid their white workers much higher salaries than their black counterparts, and in
1978 Coca-Cola refused to cooperate with a Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee investigation into the
role of American subsidiaries in perpetuating South Africa's racist policies.190 At the time, three of Coke's
bottling franchises in South Africa were directly owned by the parent Company in Atlanta, and 70% of the
South African market belonged to Coke.191 The Company probably did not think it necessary to answer to
questions regarding plant policies because of its strong hold on the market.
Because of America's heightened racial awareness, in 1968 Congress passed sanctions on the apartheid regime
for the rst time|a blow to the Coca-Cola Company, whose South African business was booming.192 In
1985, a few months after the anti-apartheid activists picketed Coke's centennial celebration, the Company
announced that it planned to disinvest in South Africa, following a boycott threat from the Reverend Joseph
Lowery and his Atlanta-based Southern Christian Leadership Conference.193 Furthermore, Coke stated that
it would sell its bottling plants to qualied black owners. The Company set up an Equal Opportunity Fund
(EOF) with a 10 million dollar endowment. The Company's concentrate plant moved from Durban to black-
controlled Swaziland, instantly doubling that tiny country's tax revenue.194 While Coca-Cola undoubtedly
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42helped South Africa, especially through the EOF, it was not, as the Reverend claimed, making a \a strong
moral statement,"195 but rather responding to public opinion. Furthermore, Coca-Cola continued to supply
its independent bottlers with syrup and marketing advice, leading some to wonder if this really was a
\disinvestment" at all.196
In February 1990, Nelson Mandela was released from prison and in 1991 apartheid in South Africa was
abolished by statute. Coca-Cola immediately sent Carl Ware, its \persuasive black executive,"197 to befriend
Mandela and convince him to call o the boycott against Coke that he had encouraged.198 Ware convinced
Mandela that the Company would give its full support in a new black-run regime and join the struggle
against apartheid.199 This is not surprising; Coca-Cola has always been willing to adapt to new political
situations. Thus, while in the past the Company had beneted from apartheid, now it would ght against
it. Mandela changed his mind about Coca-Cola, no doubt realizing that money had to speak louder than
principles in order to get South Africa back on its feet.
In all fairness to Coca-Cola, the Company has done good things in South Africa, even if its acts have been
motivated by prot rather than ethics. According to a 1999 study, it is estimated that 178,205 jobs in South
Africa have been supported, directly or indirectly, by the Coca-Cola Company.200 The study claims that
the Coca-Cola system interacts with a multitude of small retail businesses on a daily basis, and helps these
mom-and pop stores to survive and thrive by providing unrivaled brand recognition, quick turnover, and
high margins.201 The business of producing, distributing, and selling soft drinks has a signicant economic
impact on these micro-enterprises, and according to the study the total direct and indirect contribution
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43of the Coca-Cola network to South Africa's gross domestic product was estimated to be U.S. $1.9 billion
in 1998.202 Informal distribution channels generate thousands of ongoing enterprises, and about 215,000
informal traders connect with the Coca-Cola system.203 According to the study: \These small shopkeepers
and other trade ventures also have a strong vested interest in maintaining safe communities with adequate
property protection. Some form community associations...they [the shops] become social and political hubs,
a place in the neighborhood to exchange information."204 Clearly, Coca-Cola has contributed to South
Africa's economic and political growth, and to small business development. As Mark Pendergrast put it:
\For its own selsh ends, then, Coca-Cola does indeed try to promote the peace and harmony it promises in
its commercials."205 Pendergrast does not, however, question whether this level of responsibility is enough,
or whether the Company should consistently live up to the image that it has perpetuated throughout its
history and that it continues to perpetuate, regardless of prots.
Current Image and More Recent Criticisms
The Company currently advertises itself as \a company you can count on" and as \a welcomed friend and
trusted neighbor" that has earned its place by being \involved, concerned and committed citizens."206 The
Company claims that Coca-Cola helps to \reinforce the values of family strength, security, and love,"207
and it has recently formed a partnership with Harry Potter to emphasize its commitment to \friendship,
love, self-reliance...shared experiences...and diversity."208 The Company also prides itself on \maintaining
a special place in local cultures."209 Of course, there have been changes in Coca-Cola's advertising over
the years as politics and public opinion have changed. For example, to respond to people's increased health
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44consciousness, Coca-Cola no longer claims that its products can \aid digestion" but rather that one needs
\psychological refreshment" as well as nutritious food and Coca-Cola can provide the former.210 Additionally,
in response to criticisms that the Company sells its nutrition-devoid drinks to people around the world that
barely have enough to eat211, Coca-Cola has developed fortied snack drinks whose packaging specically
appeals to children and whose nutritional content appeals to mothers.212 What has remained consistent
over the years, however, is the general theme that the Coca-Cola brand, which is at the center of all the
Company's products, is a symbol of good American values and that somehow drinking Coke will contribute
to those values. Coca-Cola is necessary to one's way of life: this is the message the Company has propagated
throughout its history.
Yet Coke's history contradicts its pure image, as the previous examples have emphasized. It is important
to distinguish, however, between instances in which Coca-Cola is merely a convenient scapegoat for U.S.
practices or policies in general, and instances in which Coca-Cola itself has contributed to social injustices.
For example, in 1999 Coke was targeted by Chinese students upset about the NATO bombing of the Chinese
Embassy in Yugoslavia, and by French caf e owners angry over U.S. trade policies.213 Coca-Cola did not
cause or contribute to the bombing or the unpopular trade policies; Coca-Cola merely served as a convenient
product to boycott in protest. However, there are instances, mentioned above, in which Coca-Cola itself has
contributed to human rights violations or other realities that are socially undesirable. In addition to the
examples already discussed, more recent examples serve to demonstrate the ongoing contradictions between
the image and the reality of Coca-Cola.
Nigeria
210Louis & Yazijian, supra note 5, at 255.
211See, e.g., Free Nigeria Movement, Boycott Coca-Cola! 1 (1997), http://www.freenigeria.org/coke.html.
212See The Coca-Cola Company, supra note 208, at 21.
213Elise Ackerman, It's the Real Thing: A Crisis at Coca-Cola, U.S. News Online, Oct. 4, 1999, at 3, available at
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/issue/991004/coke.html. The author points out that Coke's status as an American icon
is as likely to promote a boycott as a sale.
45Coca-Cola was criticized and boycotted for supporting the military regime under General Sani Abacha, the
Nigerian dictator accused of murderous human rights violations who died on June 8, 1998.214 Those who
urged the boycott of Coke in the U.S. pointed out that Coca-Cola, by co-sponsoring events organized by
General Abacha, became a propaganda tool for the military regime to \show that even the best known
company/product on earth endorses military rule."215 The boycotters accused Coca-Cola of beneting
from the illegal and illegitimate regime (its market share increased by 9% under it) while the duly elected
Representatives of the Nigerian people \languished in Abacha's jails."216 The boycotters also pointed out the
irony inherent in Coke's claim that it is apolitical, stating that by aligning itself with the regime it is making
a political choice to give it legitimacy, and by not speaking out against human rights abuses they \give silent
approval to such abuses."217 In a 1997 article discussing the then recently signed deal between the Madison
Metropolitan School District and Coke to allow for a $1.5 million marketing contract, teachers and students
expressed their disapproval.218 Many saw the irony that in Madison, WI, Coca-Cola was trying to portray
itself as a supporter of children's interests, while halfway around the world in Nigeria \they are supporting a
regime which has contributed to the deaths of millions of children."219 This article also points out that many
corporations pulled out of Nigeria because of the impossibility of doing business there without nancially
supporting the crimes of the Abacha regime. Coca-Cola decided to stay, and in doing so it clearly put prots
ahead of principle. The fact that many other companies did leave Nigeria gives rise to the question whether
or not Coke should have done the same|staying surely was not consistent with its image as a \trusted friend
and neighbor" or \concerned citizen." In many ways Coke's role in Nigeria is reminiscent of its role in Nazi
214In May 1999, Nigeria elected Olusegum Obasanjo as President, the rst democratically elected president since 1979. He
has taken over a dismal economy, feuding ethnic groups, and depressed oil prices, but Nigerians hope he will be able to improve
the country's economy and aid in the move towards democracy.
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46Germany decades earlier.
Tabasco, Mexico
If Nigeria is reminiscent of Nazi Germany, then Mexico is denitely reminiscent of Guatemala. In September
1999, violence broke out at the Tabasco Coca-Cola plant and administrative headquarters, two weeks before
a highly anticipated vote was to be held in which workers would decide whether or not to break away from
the current union aligned with Mexico's ruling political party (CROC) to join a new independent union.
Several Coca-Cola employees in favor if union dissent were sitting inside the front entrance of the plant
discussing the upcoming vote with co-workers, when a group of unidentied men allegedly hired by the
leader of CROC arrived on the scene and attacked them with metal, tubes, clubs and bayonets.220 Hector
Mendoza Borja, Director of Human Resources at the Coca-Cola plant, allegedly ordered locks to be put
on the front entrance following the arrival of the aggressors so that the workers would not be able to ee
the attack.221 Following an investigation into the attack, Coca-Cola management allegedly complied with
intimidation tactics to scare the dissident unionists at the plant, and hired 200 armed guards to monitor
activity at the plant.222 The Coca-Cola parent Company managers stated that it was not their policy to get
involved in its franchisee's local aairs and politics, even though there was evidence that the local bottler
had violated minimum labor standards in place.223 Thus, the situation in Mexico serves as a more recent
example of Coca-Cola picking and choosing when and how it will enter politics. Yet to remain apolitical in
these circumstances is in direct contradiction to Coke's image as an American representative abroad, since
this image (which the Company worked hard to create) is by its very nature political.
Marketing Strategies and the Coca-Cola Brand: Will Coke Ever Lose its American Icon Status?
220Nizkor Int. Human Rights Team, Labour Racketeering Used to Impede Right to Organize at the Tabasco, Mexico Coca-Cola
Plant 1 (1999), http://www.peace.ca/labourracketeering.html.
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47One interesting question is whether or not the Company's new strategy to \think local and act local" in
its overseas marketing will eventually undermine Coca-Cola's status as an American icon, hence changing
its image from that of an American representative abroad to a \local company" and thus making it less
important for the Company to conduct itself with its American icon status always in mind. A company
should of course always conduct itself in an ethical manner, but what makes Coke unique is that it created
its image as an American ambassador abroad to appeal to its American consumers' feelings of patriotism and
political views, and it has perpetuated its product as a symbol of good American values throughout its history,
making any actions against that image hypocritical and dishonest. Yet if Coke's image changes and loses
its connection with America, becoming a local product in each country where it is sold, Americans may no
longer hold the Company to such a high level of scrutiny. Since it is the consumer who often has the power to
curb any unethical activity of a company through boycotting, if Coca-Cola becomes suciently disassociated
from its American roots, American consumers may no longer be interested in speaking out against what this
seemingly \non-American" company is doing abroad. However, it seems clear that although the Company
has put forth many new brands in recent years to appeal to local tastes|from Cappy in Czechosolvakia to
Mone in Japan|many of which the American public has never even heard of, at the center of all these other
products is the Coca-Cola brand, a uniquely America product that will probably always be the rst on the
market in every country that the Company enters.
In fact, attempts in the past to change Coca-Cola itself have met with disapproval and contempt from
American consumers. In April 1985, Roberto C. Goizueta, the chairman and chief executive ocer of Coca-
Cola at the time, announced that New Coke would replace Coke on the market. Goizueta had changed the
formula of Coke|the secret, mysterious formula that everyone loved|and the result by all accounts was a
public outcry.224 People across the country demanded the return of the original Coca-Cola. Interestingly
224E.g., Allen, supra note 38, at 413.
48enough, the reason Goizueta had changed the formula in the rst place is that nearly two hundred thousand
consumer taste tests had revealed a resounding preference for the new taste.225 Ironically, the new formula
made Coke sweeter and less zzy|i.e. more like Pepsi, Coke's most serious competitor. Roger Enrico, the
President and CEO of the Pepsi-Cola Company at the time, was delighted, and gave all Pepsi employees
a day o to celebrate the victory. 226 According to Enrico, by changing the formula to make it more like
Pepsi, the Coca-Cola Company was admitting that Pepsi did in fact taste better.227
If Coke consumers really preferred the new taste in the blind taste tests, why would they object to New
Coke? The reason undoubtedly seems to be that it was not the taste of Coke that had come to mean so much
to consumers but rather the image behind the drink. Coke had come to symbolize continuity, stability, and
tradition, and changing the formula was a violation of this image. Sergio Zyman, a marketer for the Coca-
Cola Company at the time that New Coke was launched, states in his book that New Coke was promising
choice and change, and \consumers who had a strong understanding and feeling for the brand [Coca-Cola] and
its core foundational elements would not accept something that seemed so contrary to what they understood
the product to be about."228 Zyman also states that a product must remain true to its image, and he
compares Coca-Cola to Pepsi: \Pepsi, unlike Coke, does stand for choice and change."229 Zyman continues:
\Its [Pepsi's] positioning has always been about youth, doing things dierently and unpredictably...for
Coke, a sentimental ad about going to a family reunion and warm fuzzy images of Santa Claus...might be
perfect, whereas for Pepsi drinkers, ads like this would be a major shock."230 Thus, consumers objected to
the change in formula because change itself was inherently not what Coke was ever about. As one angry
American wrote: \Changing Coke is like God making the grass purple."231 Another consumer stated: \I
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49don't think I would be more upset if you were to burn a ag on our front yard."232 Coke had become sacred;
not all products inspire such passion in people. The Company, realizing it had made a mistake, oered a
public apology to its consumers and brought back the original Coca-Cola under a new name: Coca-Cola
Classic. Coca-Cola Classic soon became known as the \The Real Thing" in Coke ads, never to be changed
again.
Robert Woodru had worked hard to make sure not only that Coke would be associated with good American
values, but also that it would always remain the same|a symbol of continuity and certainty. For example,
once it was clear that the drink would be sold overseas, there were those who recommended modifying its
avor to suit the taste bud of each nationality, but Woodru refused, sticking to his belief that Coke's single,
secret formula would provide universal appeal. Of course, the Company has since diversied and developed
dierent brands, but the formula of the Coca-Cola brand has remained the same around the globe. Another
example of Woodru's refusal to diversify in even the smallest way was his refusal to change Coke's packaging
until forced to do so. Coke was sold in the characteristic six-ounce bottles until the 1950s when it became
clear that competition from other soft drink companies, especially Pepsi, made it necessary to diversify its
packaging to compete.233 Additionally, when the Company introduced Sprite in 1961, Woodru complained
that the citrus avor was too sweet and that the Company should stick to what it knew best|producing
and selling Coke.234 The public, in many ways, also agreed that the Company should stick to what it knew
best. In 1977, Coke attempted to diversify into the wine business. It never earned much money, and angry
Southern Baptist stockholders complained that their pure company should not promote alcohol.235 Asa
Candler no doubt would have agreed. Coca-Cola started as a National Temperance Drink, and to move into
the wine business did not t in with this early image. Coca-Cola soon abandoned its wine ventures.
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50This image of Coke as unchanging was clearly embedded in the public's mind by the time New Coke was
released. Some cynics believe that the Company planned the entire asco to rejuvenate the public's interest
in the old Coke.236 Sergio Zyman states that the Company did not realize the public's attachment to Coke,
and did not realize fully that people buy it because \it's old and familiar and they feel comfortable with
it," not just for the taste.237 Yet Zyman states that New Coke was certainly not a mistake because it did
ultimately serve to \revitalize the relationship of the brand Coca-Cola with consumers in the United States"
even if it didn't \play out as I had thought."238
Given Coke's history, it seems highly unlikely that the Company would ever be able to get away with changing
the Coca-Cola brand, even if it wanted to. Coca-Cola will always be constant, and will always be a uniquely
American product. Similarly, no matter how much the Company \localizes," the Coca-Cola Company will
always be viewed by the world as a uniquely American company. Yet there has always been a tension
between the Company's advertising of its product as American and the Company's desire to be accepted as
a \national" of each country in which it does business, and for its products to be considered local products.
Douglas Daft, the current chairman and CEO of Coca-Cola, has stated that the company will \think locally
and act locally."239 This strategy is part of Daft's overall plan to decentralize Coca-Cola's management and
give local responsibility back to local managers to \ride the second wave of globalization."240 Daft attributes
Coke's slower volume growth and drop in earnings in the mid to late nineties to a change in global conditions,
requiring exibility and adaptation on the Company's part.
In the mid eighties the Company decided to centralize operations and consolidate many local, independent
bottling companies in order to provide more ecient service to an increasingly consolidated retail trade.
This strategy served the shareholders well, but by the mid-nineties it was no longer working. Daft states:
236Oliver, supra note 3, at 181.
237Zyman, supra note 47, at 48.
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51\The rapid change and the uncertainty of global markets...are triggering a desire to withdraw, pull the
shades, and safeguard local brands."241 According to Daft, Coca-Cola needs to respond to this situation
by moving back to decentralization, which means local management and responsibility, and local brands
and advertising.242 Daft seeks to make Coca-Cola a truly multi-branded drinks company by boosting the
smaller brands that Coca-Cola already owns and creating new ones. The new CEO plans to shift the focus
from soda to faster- growing teas, waters, and juices, representing \a radical change for what had been a
one-drink wonder company."243 According to Daft: \People don't buy drinks globally...you can't pander
to similarities between people...you have to nd the dierences."244 Thus, Coca-Cola managers should not
count on Coca-Cola to simply sell itself. Zyman states the same view: \Even though Coke means many
things to many people today, things won't stay that way. Loyalty and attachment are perishable. The
company will have to continue to broaden that denition, and if it doesn't, the denition will narrow by
itself."245 Although Coca-Cola has always prided itself on adapting to local cultures, Daft seems to be the
rst leader at Coca-Cola to suggest that the brand Coca-Cola may not be as special, or as sacred, as people
once thought.
Nonetheless, it would take generations for the image of Coke as inherently American, and as symbolic of
American values, to leave the consumer's mind, either in the U.S. or abroad. While the Company has
successfully marketed local brands to suit local tastes, and will continue to do so under Daft's new plan,
the brand Coca-Cola itself will probably not change. Thus, at the center of this \think local, act local"
approach there remains a brand with a history that is grounded in an American context. It is likely that
wherever the Coca-Cola Company goes, it will not be able to shake its image as an American representative
abroad. Furthermore, even if it were able to shed this image, which the \think local, act local" approach
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52perhaps seeks to do, the Company obviously plans to cling to that part of its image that is symbolic of
goodness, honesty, and truth, as is evident in Daft's statement (and numerous Company publications) that
Coca-Cola must rst and foremost be \a trusted friend and a good neighbor" in every country where it does
business,246 and be \open," \caring," and \lead as model citizens in every community we serve."247 Thus,
regardless of whether Coca-Cola loses its American icon status in the countries in which it is sold (which is
highly unlikely), it will always be symbolic of goodness, purity, and honesty, and so the Company should
conduct itself in accordance with these values in a consistent manner, not merely when it is politically or
economically convenient to do so.
Conclusion
Coca-Cola is one of the most successful and powerful multinational corporations in the world, with busi-
nesses in nearly 200 countries. From its early beginnings to the present, the Company has been blessed
with strong, determined, and politically savvy leaders who have molded Coca-Cola into the global product
that it is today. The Company prides itself on the image of Coca-Cola as symbolic of all things good and
right|an image that as we have seen took the Company years to create. By manipulating religious, cultural,
and most importantly political views and events, the Coca-Cola Company was able to make Coca-Cola a
symbol of grand, larger than life concepts, concepts such as freedom, democracy, American patriotism, and
salvation. Throughout its life, the common theme has been that Coca-Cola symbolizes goodness, decency,
and tradition, grounded contextually in the American way of life. In spite of recent renewed attempts to
diversify on the international level and change the Company's image from American outsider to local neigh-
bor, the Company, and its core Coca-Cola brand, will probably always call to the consumer's mind images
of America, for better or for worse. Coca-Cola has inspired a level of passion and emotion in people that
246Daft, supra note 239, at 11.
247Id.
53most products could never inspire. This level of emotion surrounding a soft drink|something that no one
needs to survive anyway|is the result of consistent advertising over the years to raise Coke from the level of
zzy soft drink to the level of politics. Coca-Cola is politics, despite Company managers' insistence to the
contrary. Furthermore, by claiming to be apolitical and refusing to promote any social or political good other
than increased Coke consumption, the Company is doing a disservice to the image that it so painstakingly
created|the image of Coke as good, responsible, and genuine.
It is true that Coca-Cola has made eorts at corporate responsibility through educational programs, in-
vestment in local economies, increased spending in minority-and women-owned businesses, and support for
organizations focused on neighborhood revitalization. Coca-Cola has indeed contributed to humanity, yet it
seems reasonable to assert that it only does so when it is in its own best nancial interest to do so. Even
consumer boycotts boil down to money|the Company changes its policies following a large enough boycott
not out of a sense of duty but because to do otherwise would result in a loss of consumers. One need only
browse the web to nd articles questioning Coca-Cola's business practices abroad. The Company's history
is marred with accusations of union busting, systematic racism, and human rights abuses. Even at home
in the U.S. Coca-Cola has faced accusations ranging from discrimination against black employees248 to the
maintenance of horrendous working conditions for migrant workers.249 One of the suggestions in this paper
has been that Coca-Cola should take greater pains to be true to the image that it has created for itself and
act in a responsible and ethical manner, even when doing so may in the short run result in loss of prots.
It is true that all companies should conduct themselves ethically, yet this paper argues that Coca-Cola,
having used politics to its advantage to present itself as an American ambassador abroad and a symbol of
freedom and all things honest and ethical, has an even greater responsibility to behave in accordance with
248See, e.g., Dan Sewell, Black Workers Sue Coke 1, http://www.redherring.hm/cba/blackworkers.html. (pointing out that
the average black employee earns less than the average white employee even though the Company directly markets its products
to blacks and blacks make up 25% of the purchase of Coke brands).
249Pendergrast, supra note 1, at 293.
54this image|to do otherwise is dishonest.
Coca-Cola has proted from its image, and was only able to create this image in the rst place by entering
politics; thus, to claim neutral, apolitical status to avoid responsibility for its activities at home and abroad
is disingenuous. At the very least the Company should not aid or contribute to social injustices, and I would
argue that it should use its power to accomplish some greater social goods. This strategy may ultimately end
up increasing prots over the long-term as people come to respect a Company that is true to its word. Even
if a greater social and ethical awareness were to result in some prot loss, such a loss would probably not
even begin to put a dent in what is arguably the world's most successful transnational company. Coca-Cola
asked for the status it now possesses, and thus it seems reasonable that it should be responsible for repre-
senting itself in accordance with the good values that its image encompasses. Although consumer pressure
through boycotts results in a public awareness that does serve to keep companies like Coca-Cola in check,
such measures often take time and are sometimes ineective. The best prevention of social and political ills
would undoubtedly come from pressure within the Company itself. Some might believe that such social and
ethical responsibility is unrealistic for a company in the business of making money for its shareholders. Yet
Coca-Cola has always portrayed itself as so much more than a company just out to make money|surely it
owes some respect to this image, the image that enabled it to capture the public's hearts and minds in the
rst place.
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